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Note
Going Back in Time: The Search for Retroactive
Rulemaking Power in Statutory Deadlines
Chris Schmitter*
In 2010, American fuel refiners faced a mess. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had long since missed a
2008 congressional deadline to update the rules that govern the
1
production of renewable fuels. Because EPA failed to act, the
2
refiners started 2010 under the old rules. However, by July 1
of that year, long after Congress’s deadline, EPA finally implemented the new rules and, to make up for lost time, made them
3
retroactive to all of 2010. In other words, the requirements
companies had to meet for January through June suddenly in4
creased, retroactively, after July 1. Refiners were outraged at
5
these retroactive regulations and challenged them in federal
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Minnesota Law Review, for their help in publishing this piece and for the honor of getting to work with them on Volume 97. And thank you to Erin Bailey,
whose love and support during my time in law school has meant more to me
than I can possibly express in words. Copyright © 2013 by Chris Schmitter.
1. Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n v. EPA (Nat’l Petrochemical &
Refiners Ass’n I), 630 F.3d 145, 147–52 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh’g denied, 643 F.3d
958 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 571 (2011).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. It is important to note that refiners could not simply have conformed their behavior to the requirements found in the statute, without waiting for EPA to act. The relevant statute sets nationwide annual goals for the
volume of renewable fuels produced, but it leaves to EPA the determination of
what the relevant percentage should be for individual refiners. Id.
5. Brief for Petitioners at 14–18, Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n I,
630 F.3d 145 (No. 10-1070) (noting the significant changes included in the new
rules and arguing that a company that imported diesel fuel in February of
2010 would not have had any reporting requirements under the old rule, but
would be retroactively encompassed by the new rules).
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6

court. In a surprising decision, however, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit approved
7
EPA’s retroactive action.
This scenario may seem irrelevant to all but a handful of
companies and curious administrative law scholars. In reality,
however, many government agencies are currently facing unprecedented pressure to craft retroactive rules. In the wake of
the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (PPACA) and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street reform bill,
8
agencies are promulgating a “tsunami” of new rules. They are
generating many of these rules by specific statutory deadlines
9
and it is likely that agencies will miss some deadlines and be
forced to consider whether to give these rules retroactive effect.
Whether retroactivity appears in statutes or rules, the Supreme Court has held that “[r]etroactivity is not favored in the
10
law.” Indeed, the Court has stated that retroactive rulemaking is only appropriate when Congress has explicitly authorized
11
it. Despite this prohibition, some judges, including Justice
Scalia, have proposed an exception that would allow agencies to
12
promulgate retroactive rules if they miss a statutory deadline.
In other words, if an agency fails to meet a deadline for implementing a rule, it could later promulgate that same rule retroactive to the statutory deadline it missed, even absent explicit
congressional authorization. In response to the fuel-refiner sce6. Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n I, 630 F.3d at 146–47.
7. Id. at 162–64.
8. See, e.g., James T. O’Reilly & Melissa D. Berry, The Tsunami of
Health Care Rulemaking: Strategies for Survival and Success, 63 ADMIN. L.
REV. 245, 246–47 (2011) (“There is no question that PPACA will result in a
tsunami of new administrative rulemaking.”); Amanda Engstrom, Dodd-Frank
Unleashes a Tsunami of Regulation: A Visual, FREE ENTERPRISE (Jan. 24,
2011), http://www.freeenterprise.com/2011/01/dodd-frank-unleashes-a-tsunami
-of-regulation-a-visual (anticipating the “regulatory tsunami” and providing a
chart which lists the rulemakings that will occur during the implementation of
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street reform legislation).
9. Jean Eaglesham, Overhaul Grows and Slows, WALL ST. J., May 2,
2011, at C1 (“The sheer number of rules still in the pipeline makes it almost
inevitable agencies will miss an increasing number of deadlines over the next
year.” (quotations omitted)).
10. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
11. Id.
12. See id. at 224–25 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“If, for example, a statute
prescribes a deadline by which particular rules must be in effect, and if the
agency misses that deadline, the statute may be interpreted to authorize a
reasonable retroactive rule despite the limitation of the [Administrative Procedure Act].”); see also Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n I, 630 F.3d at 162–
63 (adopting Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Bowen as authoritative).

1116

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:1114

nario described above, the D.C. Circuit adopted this very exception in National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n v. EPA, shock13
ing many regulated parties and spurring a heated debate on
14
the D.C. Circuit.
The issue at the center of this intense debate is the focus of
the discussion that follows. This Note analyzes what it calls the
tardy-agency problem: the unresolved question of whether an
agency is authorized to promulgate a retroactive rule after
missing a statutory deadline, without explicit authorization
from Congress. With agencies facing myriad new deadlines, the
tardy-agency problem is critically important for regulated parties. In light of National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n, regulated entities that might usually assume agency rules can only
be applied prospectively, must now ask whether retroactivity is
allowed when agencies miss deadlines. Furthermore, this issue
carries broader implications for government effectiveness and
the political struggle between the President and Congress.
While allowing retroactive rulemaking might weaken the effect
of statutory deadlines, barring retroactivity might allow a President who disagrees with Congress’s policy to miss agency
deadlines in order to grant reprieve to regulated parties and
15
flout the will of the legislative branch. Despite the urgency of
this issue for regulated parties and the broader concerns it
raises, there has been little scholarship on retroactive rulemaking broadly and no scholarship on the tardy-agency problem
16
specifically. And the case law on this issue includes little help17
ful reasoning to guide courts or parties in the future. Courts
13. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 27–30, Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n v. EPA (Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n III), 132 S. Ct. 571
(2011) (No. 11-102) (expressing deep concern over the D.C. Circuit’s holding
and its potential effect on fuel refiners and other parties facing large regulatory schemes).
14. Compare Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n I, 630 F.3d at 162–63
(stating that the D.C. Circuit has accepted Justice Scalia’s view that an exception to the general rule against retroactive rulemaking exists when an agency
misses a statutory deadline), with Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n v.
EPA (Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n II), 643 F.3d 958, 959–62 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (Brown, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing
that the exception “conflicts with the Supreme Court’s clear-statement rules,
usurps legislative power, renders statutory deadlines precatory, multiples uncertainty for regulated entities, and encourages lethargic administration”).
15. See infra Part II.F.
16. See infra Part I for a discussion of the existing relevant case law and
scholarship.
17. See Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n I, 630 F.3d at 162–63 (adopting Justice Scalia’s exception to the prohibition on retroactive rulemaking but
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and regulated parties are left with only the standard reasoning
and rules that apply to traditional cases of retroactive rulemaking. This critical problem demands a more nuanced solution.
This Note fills the vacuum of scholarship on the tardyagency problem. Part I introduces the relevant case law and
scholarship and reviews the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on
retroactivity. Part II analyzes the reasoning courts frequently
use to justify the prohibition on retroactive rulemaking and explains why this reasoning is insufficient to answer the tardyagency problem. Part III proposes a new model that empowers
agencies to use retroactive rulemaking in the tardy-agency
problem scenario when Congress implicitly authorizes it. Part
III concludes by explaining how this approach is consistent
with administrative law principles and how it addresses the
competing policy interests presented by this important problem.
I. THE TARDY-AGENCY PROBLEM AND THE DOCTRINES
THAT GOVERN RETROACTIVE RULEMAKING
Before considering the doctrines that govern retroactive
rulemaking, it is necessary to explain why the tardy-agency
problem exists at all. Keeping in mind that that the Supreme
Court has enunciated a general bar on retroactive rulemak18
ing, it is helpful to consider what makes the tardy-agency
problem unique. The key distinction is the existence of a statutory deadline that the relevant agency has missed.
A. AGENCY POWER AND STATUTORY DEADLINES
Agencies consistently face a large number of statutory
deadlines, requiring them to promulgate rules and take specific
19
actions by certain dates. This is especially true today, when
agencies face a “tsunami” of rules required under recently en20
acted laws. As National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n
demonstrates, it is entirely possible for an agency to miss a
focusing on the unique statutory scheme in the case and failing to provide
guidance on when the exception applies more broadly).
18. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
19. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 1079 (5th
ed. 2010) (recognizing that Congress imposes a large number of statutory
deadlines on agencies and criticizing this practice because “Congress establishes so many deadlines for so many actions by the same agency that the
agency cannot possibly use the presence of a deadline as an indication that
Congress attaches a priority to one or a few actions”).
20. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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21

statutory deadline. As such, courts have developed principles
to govern agency delay.
If an agency misses a deadline, courts must first determine
whether that agency retains the power to act. One might intuitively assume that an agency, after missing a statutory dead22
line, would lose whatever power Congress gave it. However, in
response to a split amongst the federal courts of appeals on this
23
issue, the Supreme Court held in 2003 that agencies generally
24
do retain the power to act. In Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co.,
the Court considered a challenge to the Commissioner of Social
Security’s decision to exercise the power, under federal law, to
assign retired coal workers to coal companies for retirement
25
benefits. The relevant statute required the Commissioner to
complete “all assignments before October 1, 1993,” but the
Commissioner did not meet that deadline and assigned some
26
10,000 people after October 1. In response, the Court held
that the Commissioner still retained the power to act after the
27
deadline passed. Although the statute used strong language
(e.g., the word “shall”), the Court held that, absent language
from Congress dictating what penalty to apply to a tardy agency, courts would neither take away an agency’s power nor im28
pose other “coercive sanction.”
This counterintuitive doctrine raises important questions
about agency delay and retroactivity. In a hypothetical tardyagency problem, an agency has missed a deadline and, in moving to create a rule that still meets the intent of Congress, must
decide whether to promulgate that rule back to the statutory
deadline. While Barnhart does not address retroactivity, it does
demonstrate that a statutory deadline signifies a temporal

21. Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n I, 630 F.3d at 147–52.
22. Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 923, 954–56 (2008) (describing the “most plausible
inference” that an agency loses its power after its statutory authority expires).
23. PIERCE, supra note 19, at 1088.
24. See Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 159–60 (2003).
25. Id. at 152–54.
26. Id. at 155–56.
27. Id. at 157–59.
28. Id. at 159. Barnhart extends to cases in which an agency has not
promulgated a rule by a specific statutory deadline for doing so. See Gersen &
O’Connell, supra note 22, at 954–56.
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preference on the part of Congress and that agencies retain
29
significant power despite the passage of a deadline.
B. AGENCIES AND RETROACTIVITY
Congress has delegated significant authority to agencies,
30
including the power to take substantive policymaking action.
Congress delegates this power through specific statutes, often
31
called “organic statutes,” that create and empower agencies.
An organic statute serves as the primary authority on an agency’s power, with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) laying
out general standards and procedural rules that apply only
32
when an organic statute leaves a gap in its coverage.
Agencies can take policymaking action in one of two ways.
First, agencies can interpret statutes and announce policies
33
and standards through case-by-case adjudication. Second,
agencies can do the same through rulemaking, under the pro34
cedures outlined in the APA. Agencies can use both of these
policymaking tools to take retroactive action, but the limits on
their ability to act retroactively in each context vary.
1. Adjudication
Agencies regularly engage in adjudication that covers a
wide range of topics. From complex employment cases under
the National Labor Relations Board to the simple processing of
a Social Security claim, agencies spend a significant portion of
their time and resources adjudicating claims, requests, and
35
36
disputes. While agency adjudication can take many forms,
29. See Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 22, at 954–56 (analyzing the important implications of the holding in Barnhart).
30. PIERCE, supra note 19, at 408 (discussing the delegation of power by
Congress to agencies to make substantive rules).
31. Id.
32. See Richard E. Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Procedure
and the Decline of the Trial, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 486 n.59 (2003) (noting
that the APA’s provisions serve as gap-fillers and that the relevant organic
statute trumps the APA where the two conflict).
33. See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
§ 8123 (2012) (discussing the power of an agency to decide whether to use adjudication or rulemaking to make policy).
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 19, at 702 (giving examples of agency adjudications and noting that agencies conduct “millions of adjudications each
year,” far more than the courts).
36. Id.
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scholars and courts often analogize agency adjudications to the
37
decision-making process of courts. Agencies can, and often do,
use adjudication to look beyond the case at hand and interpret
federal statutes or announce new polices, standards, or guide38
lines.
In response to agency policymaking through adjudication,
the Supreme Court, in the landmark case SEC v. Chenery
Corp., held that agencies can make the interpretations and pol39
icies they announce in adjudicatory proceedings retroactive.
Specifically, the Court stated that the negative effects of retroactivity must be balanced against the negative effects of “pro40
ducing a result which is contrary to a statutory design.”
There are limitations, however, on the extent of an agency’s power to make adjudicatory decisions retroactive. The D.C.
Circuit distinguishes between adjudicatory rules that substitute “new law for old law that was reasonably clear” and those
that are merely “new applications of [existing] law, clarifica41
tions and additions.” While an adjudicatory rule that substitutes new law for old “may justifiably be given prospectivelyonly effect in order to protect the settled expectations of those
42
who have relied on the preexisting rules,” a rule that is simply
a new application of existing law carries “a presumption of retroactivity” that courts adhere to unless the retroactivity leads
43
to “manifest injustice.” In one of the key cases to come out of
37. See, e.g., id. at 894 (noting that the agency adjudicatory decisionmaking process resembles and is often based on that of courts).
38. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (acknowledging
that agencies cannot announce every principle in the form of a rule and holding that “administrative agenc[ies] must be equipped to act either” through
rulemaking or adjudication); see also NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S.
267, 294 (1974) (summarizing court precedent and reiterating that an agency
is “not precluded from announcing new principles in an adjudicative proceeding and that the choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies” with the
agency in question).
39. See Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. at 202 (holding that an agency must be
able to make policies either by general rule or by individual order and that
giving such policies retroactive effect would not automatically invalidate
them); see also Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 224 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“[N]othing prevents the agency from acting retroactively through adjudication.”).
40. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. at 203.
41. Verizon Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 269 F.3d 1098, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Pub. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 91 F.3d 1478, 1488 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
42. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
43. Qwest Servs. Corp. v. FCC, 509 F.3d 531, 539 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting AT&T v. FCC, 454 F.3d 329, 332 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
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Chenery Corp., the D.C. Circuit established a multi-factor balancing test to assess whether retroactive adjudicatory action is
45
appropriate. The Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union
test asks (1) whether the case is “one of first impression,” (2)
whether the rule is “an abrupt departure from well established
practice,” (3) to what extent the regulated party in question relied on the previous rule, (4) what is the burden on the regulated party, and (5) what is the “statutory interest in applying a
46
new rule.” Thus, within the confines of the test above, adjudication is a process agencies regularly use to make policies and
rules that have retroactive effect.
2. Rulemaking
As noted above, agencies can make substantive policy
through rulemaking. Agencies largely make substantive rules,
called legislative rules, through the so-called “notice-and47
comment” procedures outlined in Section 553 of the APA. Before discussing retroactive rulemaking, however, it is necessary
to make several points. First, it is not always clear whether an
agency’s action is retroactive. Courts define a retroactive rule
as one that “takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing law, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or
48
considerations already past.” Second, while agencies make
policy through substantive legislative rules, they can frequently
use interpretative rules to put forth interpretations of relevant
49
statutes. These interpretative rules do not carry the same
44. See, e.g., William V. Luneburg, Retroactivity and Administrative
Rulemaking, 1991 DUKE L.J. 106, 113 (describing the central role the test explained above has played in assessing retroactive adjudicatory actions).
45. Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 390
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
46. Id. But see Verizon Tel. Cos., 269 F.3d at 1109–10 (acknowledging the
importance of the Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union test but also
admitting that the D.C. Circuit has applied other similar tests in assessing the
reasonableness of retroactive adjudicatory action).
47. See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 19, at 561–69 (describing the tendency of
agencies to use the procedures outlined in Section 553 of the APA, called “notice-and-comment” rulemaking, to make rules).
48. Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Dep’t of Labor, 292 F.3d 849, 859 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (quoting Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 177 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C.
Cir. 1999)); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994) (using a similar definition to describe retroactive statutes).
49. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Rules—Interpretative, Legislative, and Retroactive, 57 YALE L.J. 919, 928–34 (1948) (providing a still-
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weight that legislative rules do and, therefore, do not fall under
50
any bar on retroactive rulemaking. The tardy-agency problem
does not involve agency interpretative rules. Finally, there is a
distinction between instances in which an agency proactively
gives a rule retroactive effect and when an agency applies a
51
current rule retroactively. This discussion focuses on the former.
Agencies’ ability to engage in retroactive rulemaking
52
changed in 1988. The Supreme Court’s decision in Bowen v.
Georgetown University Hospital reduced the ability of agencies
53
to apply rules retroactively. Although lower courts have developed the retroactive rulemaking analysis further since Bow54
en, it is helpful to break down the retroactive rulemaking jurisprudence into pre- and post-Bowen eras.
a. Pre-Bowen
Prior to the Bowen decision in 1988, agencies regularly
55
“engaged in retroactive rulemaking.” Although there is little
56
case law dealing with retroactive rulemaking prior to Bowen,
decisions by the Supreme Court and the lower courts do provide
some guidance on the issue. In Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit
Products, Inc., prior to the enactment of the APA, the Supreme
Court considered regulatory exemptions from the Fair Labor
Standards Act, promulgated by the Administrator of the Wage

illuminating discussion on the difference, both real and theoretical, between
legislative and interpretative rules).
50. See id. at 958–59 (arguing that where interpretative rules do not
change law, their retroactivity poses no problem, but that in the more common
instance when they do change law, their retroactivity should be dealt with like
legislative rules).
51. See Luneburg, supra note 44, at 122–23 (explaining the difference between retroactive application of a regulation and proactive efforts to promulgate a retroactive rule).
52. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988); see also
PIERCE, supra note 19, at 482 (claiming that Bowen “drastically” changed the
body of law governing retroactive rulemaking).
53. PIERCE, supra note 19, at 485 (asserting that the Bowen decision will
likely force agencies to make retroactive policy through the adjudicatory process).
54. Id. at 487–95 (discussing how the lower courts have applied Bowen in
retroactive rulemaking decisions since 1988).
55. Id. at 481.
56. See Luneburg, supra note 44, at 122 (pointing out that, before Bowen,
“there were relatively few cases in which the Supreme Court directly confronted the question of agency authority to act retroactively through” rulemaking).
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57

and Hour Division. The Court held that the exemptions went
58
beyond the reach of the statute and invalidated them. The
Court directed the Administrator to promulgate new regula59
tions and to make those regulations retroactive. Although the
Court acknowledged the dangers of retroactive rulemaking, it
ultimately found that any other result would produce outcomes
“contrary to the statutory design” and held that retroactivity
60
was the “lesser evil.”
While their decisions vary, the lower courts largely applied
some variation of the Retail, Wholesale & Department Store
Union test to cases of retroactive rulemaking, despite the fact
61
that the D.C. Circuit created it for adjudication. Under this
test, lower courts sometimes found retroactivity permissible. In
Maxcell Telecom Plus, Inc. v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit affirmed
the FCC’s decision to change an application process for certain
62
regulated parties. In doing so, the court applied Chenery Corp.
and the Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union balancing
test and found that the impact on the regulated parties was
minimal and that the interest of the FCC in efficiently proc63
essing applications was significant. In Citizens to Save Spencer County v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit considered a decision by
64
EPA to give two rules retroactive effect. The court upheld
EPA’s actions, arguing that the retroactivity was reasonable
because it minimally affected the parties, the parties had sufficient notice, and the agency qualified under the APA for a good57. Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 608–09 (1944).
While rule-like actions taken by the Wage and Hour Division are generally interpretative, the Court considers these rules as being legislative and thus the
case informs the modern debate on retroactive rulemaking. See Davis, supra
note 49, at 932 n.63 (stating that the Court considered the Administrator’s
regulation here to be legislative); see also Luneburg, supra note 44, at 122–23
(discussing Addison’s significance without focusing on the distinction between
interpretative and legislative rules).
58. Addison, 322 U.S. at 619 (“[T]he regulations . . . are ultra vires.”).
59. Id. at 620 (“The accommodation that we are making assumes . . . that
the Administrator will retrospectively act . . . . To be sure this will be a retrospective judgment, and law should avoid retroactivity as much as possible. But
other possible dispositions likewise involve retroactivity, with the added mischief of producing a result contrary to the statutory design.”).
60. Id. at 620–22.
61. See Luneburg, supra note 44, at 113.
62. Maxcell Telecom Plus, Inc. v. FCC, 815 F.2d 1551, 1555–56 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
63. Id.
64. Citizens to Save Spencer Cnty. v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844, 879–80 (D.C.
Cir. 1979).
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cause exception to the law’s normal procedural requirements.
In another case, the First Circuit upheld a retroactive Medicare
regulation after comparing “the public interest in the retroac66
tive rule with the private interests that are overturned by it.”
Other courts, applying the same standard, held retroactivity impermissible. In Mason General Hospital v. Secretary of the
Department of Health & Human Services, for example, the
Sixth Circuit invalidated the department’s attempt to apply a
67
rule retroactively back to 1979. The court applied a modified
version of the Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union test,
focusing largely on the need to comply with the statutory purpose underlying the regulations, the impact on the parties, and
68
the degree of capriciousness in the agency’s action. The cases
of the pre-Bowen era show that courts, through the application
of complex balancing analyses, worked to effectuate statutory
purpose.
b. Bowen
In 1988, the United States Supreme Court clarified the law
69
regarding retroactive rulemaking. In Bowen, the Court considered a challenge by hospitals in Washington, D.C. to retroactive regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Health and
70
Human Services. On June 30, 1981, the Secretary promulgated a set of regulations stating the costs for which hospitals par71
ticipating in Medicare could be reimbursed. After a district
court invalidated those regulations for violating the procedural
72
requirements of the APA, the Secretary reissued the regula73
tions on November 26, 1984. He made the regulations retroactive to July 1, 1981, and proceeded to collect over $2 million in
74
past over-payments to Washington hospitals. The parties
75
challenged the retroactive effect of the regulations.
65. Id.
66. Adams Nursing Home of Williamstown, Inc. v. Mathews, 548 F.2d
1077, 1080 (1st Cir. 1977).
67. Mason Gen. Hosp. v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 809
F.2d 1220, 1229–30 (6th Cir. 1987).
68. Id. at 1227–28.
69. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
70. Id. at 206.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 206–07.
73. Id. at 207.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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The district court applied the balancing test found in Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union and found that the
76
retroactive rules in this case were not justified. The D.C. Circuit invalidated the rules by arguing that the language of the
77
APA forbids retroactive rulemaking. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, laying out a clear new standard for
78
considering retroactive rulemaking. The Court noted that
“[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law” and held that “a statutory grant of legislative rulemaking authority will not, as a
general matter, be understood to encompass the power to
promulgate retroactive rules unless that power is conveyed by
79
Congress in express terms.” The Court found no such express
authority in the statutory language authorizing the Secretary
80
to make the rules in question and invalidated them.
In his concurrence to the Bowen decision, Justice Scalia
provided reasoning for the decision by examining the language
81
of the APA. He argued that the APA’s definition of the term
“rule,” which describes a rule in part as “an agency statement
82
of general or particular applicability and future effect,” prohib83
its rules that have retroactive effect. Justice Scalia articulated
a distinction between primary retroactivity, which alters “the
84
past legal consequences of past actions,” and secondary retroactivity, which has “exclusively future effect” but does “affect
85
past transactions.” He asserted that rules that have secondary
86
retroactive effect are valid unless unreasonable. He reaffirmed that agencies can make retroactive policies through ad-

76. Georgetown Univ. Hosp. v. Bowen, Nos. 85-1845, 35-2545, 85-2862,
1986 WL 53398, at *7–9 (D.D.C. Apr. 11, 1986).
77. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 207–08.
78. Id. at 208.
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 209–16 (analyzing the relevant statutes and finding no express
authorization from Congress of retroactive rulemaking).
81. Id. at 216 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I write separately because I find it
incomplete to discuss general principles of administrative law without reference to the basic structural legislation which is the embodiment of those principles, the Administrative Procedure Act . . . .”).
82. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2006) (emphasis added).
83. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 216–18 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that other
interpretations of “future effect” would render the statutory provision, or the
statute’s distinction between rulemaking and adjudication, meaningless).
84. Id. at 219.
85. Id. at 219–20.
86. Id. at 220.
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87

judication and speculated that some statutes provide implicit
88
authorization for retroactive rulemaking. Specifically, Justice
Scalia raised the example of an agency missing a statutory
deadline, stating that such an instance might present an exception from the general rule and implicit authorization for rea89
sonable retroactive rulemaking.
c. Post-Bowen
In the years since Bowen, lower courts have considered the
general question of retroactive rulemaking in greater detail.
The D.C. Circuit has acknowledged that the Court’s retroactivi90
ty rules can be difficult to apply and, in order to clarify the
type of retroactivity to which Bowen applies, has adopted Justice Scalia’s distinction between primary and secondary retro91
activity. Agencies have mitigated some of the effects of the bar
92
on retroactive rulemaking by making interpretative rules,
claiming the good-cause exception to the requirements of the
93
APA in order to issue rules more quickly, and establishing
94
policy through adjudication.
Specifically, the D.C. Circuit has also considered Justice
Scalia’s proposed exception and the question of whether retroactive rulemaking is justified when an agency misses a statuto87. Id. at 224 (“[N]othing prevents the agency from acting retroactively
through adjudication.”).
88. Id. (“It may even be that implicit authorization of particular retroactive rulemaking can be found in existing legislation.”).
89. Id. at 224–25.
90. Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Dep’t of Labor, 292 F.3d 849, 859 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (“The general legal principles governing retroactivity are relatively easy
to state, although not as easy to apply.”).
91. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC, 567 F.3d 659, 670–
71 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (recognizing that a rule that has primary retroactive effect,
by subjecting past conduct to new penalties, is invalid, while a rule that has
secondary retroactive effect because it “upsets expectations,” is invalid only if
arbitrary and capricious).
92. See, e.g., Farmers Tel. Co., Inc. v. FCC, 184 F.3d 1241, 1250 (10th Cir.
1999) (“We agree with the FCC that the question of retroactivity does not arise
in the present case because its ruling is merely interpretative.”). But see
Health Ins. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“As
for the retroactivity issue, we hold that courts cannot award HCFA recovery
out of deference to interpretive rules that did not exist when the transactions
at issue were conducted.”).
93. See PIERCE, supra note 19, at 488 (noting that while an agency cannot
give a rule retroactive effect, it can use the good-cause exception to avoid
APA’s procedural requirements and make the rule more quickly).
94. See supra Part I.B.1.
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95

ry deadline. In National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n, the
D.C. Circuit considered a challenge to a set of regulations dic96
tating the percentage of renewable fuels required in gasoline.
EPA had missed a statutory deadline for promulgating the regulations and applied them retroactively to the entire 2010 cal97
endar year. Without deciding whether the regulation had
98
primary or secondary retroactive effect, the court stated that
Congress had implicitly authorized EPA’s promulgation of ret99
roactive rules in this case. The court adopted Justice Scalia’s
view from the concurrence in Bowen that a statute might implicitly authorize reasonable retroactive rulemaking when an
100
agency misses a statutory deadline. Without discussing the
concerns that usually arise when courts consider retroactive
101
rulemaking, the court supported its holding by noting that
the statute in question, as written, seemed to forecast the pos102
sibility of some retroactivity. Furthermore, the court supported its holding with the judgment that the “Final Rule’s retroactivity does not make ‘the [regulated parties’] situation
103
worse.’”

95. See Sierra Club v. Whitman, 285 F.3d 63, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“There
may be an exception for situations in which the ‘statute prescribes a deadline
by which particular rules must be in effect’ and the ‘agency misses that deadline.’ Even then, retroactivity must be ‘reasonable’ . . . .” (citations omitted)
(quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 224–25 (1988)));
Celtronix Telemetry, Inc. v. FCC, 272 F.3d 585, 588 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (stating
that the D.C. Circuit holds Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Bowen as
“substantially authoritative” (citing and quoting Bergerco Can. v. U.S. Treasury Dep’t, 129 F.3d 189, 192–93 (D.C. Cir. 1997))).
96. Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n I, 630 F.3d 145, 147–52 (D.C.
Cir. 2010).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 162 (neglecting to decide whether the rule had primary or secondary retroactive effect).
99. Id. at 162–64.
100. Id. at 162–63 (“This court has treated Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion as substantially authoritative . . . .” (quoting Celtronix Telemetry, Inc., 272
F.3d at 588) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
101. Id. at 163 (stating merely that traditional issues arising in the context
of retroactive rulemaking are not applicable in this case).
102. Id. (explaining that even if EPA had promulgated rules by the applicable deadlines, the requirement of a sixty-day congressional review period
would still have forced the agency to either not abide by the law in full or apply rules retroactively).
103. Id. (contrasting EPA’s legitimate exercise of retroactive rulemaking
power with the illegitimate retroactive regulation in Sierra Club v. Whitman,
285 F.3d 63, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
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In a dissent to the decision to deny a rehearing en banc,
Judge Brown argued that the holding in National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n conflicts with the Supreme Court’s rule in
104
Bowen. She suggested that if Congress meant to fill the gap
between a missed deadline and promulgation of the final rule,
it could give an agency that power expressly or use other mechanisms to change the status quo rules until a final rule is
105
promulgated. She noted that the holding is not consistent
with the “textual emphasis on ‘future effect’” found in Justice
106
Scalia’s APA argument against retroactive rulemaking. She
also reasoned that just because the statutory provision raises
the possibility of retroactive action does not mean it provides
the sort of express approval of retroactive action required by
107
Bowen. Finally, she warned against the effects of giving a
“‘laggard agency’” the power to resolve problems caused by its
108
own delay. In summary, while agencies generally need congressional authorization to make retroactive rules, courts are
debating whether agencies can act retroactively after missing
deadlines.
II. TRADITIONAL RETROACTIVE RULEMAKING
REASONING FAILS TO SOLVE THE TARDY-AGENCY
PROBLEM
At its core, the tardy-agency problem represents a clash of
competing presumptions. And while agencies and regulated
parties count on courts to resolve this tension, the reasoning
courts typically use in response to retroactive rulemaking fails
to address the tardy-agency problem.

104. Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n II, 643 F.3d 958, 960 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (Brown, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing
that the Scalia exception conflicts with the Supreme Court’s clear rule in Bowen).
105. Id. at 961.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 962 (“[J]ust because a statutory ‘provision on its face permits
some form of retroactive action’ does not mean Congress intended to grant
general ‘authority for the retroactive promulgation of . . . rules.’” (quoting
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 209 (1988))).
108. Id. (quoting Linemaster Switch Corp. v. EPA, 938 F.2d 1299, 1303
(D.C. Cir. 1991)).
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A. COMPETING PRESUMPTIONS AND THE INSUFFICIENCY OF
BOWEN
The general rule against retroactive rulemaking, or the
Bowen rule, is a presumption that Congress, unless it explicitly
says otherwise, does not intend to grant an agency the power to
109
make retroactive rules. In other words, without the express
word of Congress, an agency is lacking a certain power (i.e., the
power to make rules retroactively). At first glance, this presumption might seem to address any and all retroactivity cases.
However, what makes the tardy-agency problem distinct is the
existence of an agency deadline. The tardy-agency problem implicates another presumption: the Barnhart rule. Where Bowen
presumes an agency lacks a certain power, the Barnhart rule
presumes that, absent explicit language to the contrary, an
agency retains the power to act after it has missed a statutory
110
deadline. In other words, despite the lack of an express word
of Congress, an agency does have a certain power (i.e., the power to act even after missing a relevant deadline).
Because the Barnhart case did not deal with retroactivi111
ty, it does not fully collide with the presumption against retroactive rulemaking. Still, the two presumptions do conflict in
the sense that the Barnhart rule acknowledges the complex
congressional intent underlying a statutory deadline and recognizes that an agency can sometimes retain the power to meet
the requirements of a statute, even when the statutory dead112
line has passed. Barnhart could be read to indicate that,
where Congress has done the work of making precise declarations about when certain policies should apply, agencies should
meet those temporal requirements, even where retroactivity is
113
required. Indeed, Bowen did not foreclose Congress’s ability
114
to implicitly authorize retroactivity and so it is possible that

109. See Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208–09.
110. See Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 159 (2003).
111. See id. at 152–53.
112. Id. at 159 (refusing to interpret a statutory deadline to mean that
Congress intends for a grant of power or authority to end at the deadline); see
also Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 22, at 954–55 (discussing the complex
considerations underlying the holding in Barnhart).
113. Cf. PIERCE, supra note 19, at 483–85 (criticizing Bowen, explaining its
potentially devastating effects, and arguing that agencies should retain the
power to act retroactively after a deadline, unless Congress says otherwise).
114. See, e.g., Brief for Federal Respondent in Opposition to Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at 10–11, Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n III, 132 S.
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a clear deadline from Congress could constitute authorization
to act retroactively.
The possibility that Congress could implicitly authorize
retroactivity and the competing presumptions inherent in the
tardy-agency problem weakens the power of the Bowen rule.
Imagine, for example, that Congress enacts a significant domestic policy program. As a part of the program, it sets a number of deadlines for relevant agencies to promulgate critical
regulations. These deadlines are interdependent and it is vital
that the agencies promulgate regulations that encompass the
time periods that are covered by the deadlines. If the agencies
miss the relevant deadlines, Barnhart assures them they do retain the power to act. In this scenario, the idea that Bowen
steps in and strips the agency of the power to effectuate Con115
gress’s temporal intent seems faulty. At a minimum, it calls
for a deeper analysis into the reasoning that generally applies
in retroactivity cases, to determine whether it adequately addresses the tardy-agency problem.
B. THE EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF THE APA
In explaining the bar on retroactive rulemaking, judges
116
may look to the language of the APA. Justice Scalia, in a concurrence explaining the rationale for the bar on retroactive
rulemaking, points to the definition of the term “rule,” found in
117
Section 551 of the APA. The APA defines a “rule” as “the
whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular
118
applicability and future effect.” While the argument that this
definition bars retroactive rulemaking may sufficiently address
some retroactivity cases, it does not solve the tardy-agency
problem.
In Bowen, the express language of the APA was sufficient
119
to justify a bar on retroactive rulemaking. The controversy in
Ct. 571 (2011) (No. 11-102) (pointing out that both parties agreed that Bowen
did not foreclose implicit congressional authorization of retroactivity).
115. See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 19, at 483 (arguing that Congress likely
does not intend to restrict retroactivity when it grants an agency extensive
rulemaking power).
116. See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 216 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (justifying the bar on retroactive rulemaking by examining the express language of the APA).
117. See, e.g., id. (examining the definition of “rule” found in Section 551
and focusing on the term “future effect”).
118. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2006) (emphasis added).
119. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208.
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that case involved the Secretary of Health and Human Services’s power to promulgate rules governing to what extent
120
Medicare reimbursed healthcare providers.
The statutory
121
provision granting him this power contained no deadline. A
court struck down the Secretary’s first rule governing the reim122
bursement rate for healthcare providers in Washington, D.C.
The Secretary then promulgated a new regulation, following
the proper procedures, which reached back and reinstated the
limit on reimbursement payments included in his earlier
123
rule. In Bowen, Congress provided no explicit guidance on
what time frame the relevant agency should attempt to cover
with its rulemaking power. When an agency has the discretion
to make a rule and no direction from Congress on when the rule
should apply, the only guidance a court has on the timing of a
rule is the APA’s general statement that rules should have “fu124
ture effect.” In other words, a court has no indication from
Congress regarding the timing of the rule, but it does know
that Congress generally defines rules as having “future effect.”
Thus, the “future effect” language sufficiently justifies the bar
on retroactive rulemaking because it provides the only indication from Congress as to the timing and applicability of the
rule.
The tardy-agency problem is different because Congress
has stepped in and provided specific requirements for the timing of the rule. In National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n, for
example, the relevant statute sets out minimum volumes of renewable fuels, increasing the volume each successive year
125
through 2022. At the same time, the statute sets out a deadline for EPA to meet in promulgating regulations regarding the
volumes of renewable fuels, stating that “[n]ot later than 1 year
after December 19, 2007, the Administrator shall revise the
regulations under this paragraph to ensure that transportation
fuel sold or introduced into commerce in the United States . . .
on an annual average basis, contains at least the applicable
126
volume . . . .” Here Congress has provided some sense of the
120. Id. at 205–06.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A) (2006).
122. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 206–07 (recounting a lower court’s decision to
strike down the Secretary’s first rule due to his failure to follow the proper
procedures under the APA).
123. Id.
124. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2006).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(B) (2006 & Supp. I 2007).
126. Id. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i).
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specific requirements it plans to apply to fuel producers and refiners and has set an explicit deadline for the regulating agency
127
to work out the details.
Although the APA may define the word “rule” using the
128
term “future effect,” the relevant organic statute in the tardyagency problem includes a specific requirement from Congress
that the rule be promulgated by a certain date. Congress has
indicated that, for any number of important reasons, it wishes
the rule to take effect on a certain date. To hold that the definition of “rule” found in the APA would bar retroactive rulemaking in a case like National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n is to
129
give that language far too much power. It would allow the
APA to neuter Congress’s intent that agencies should promulgate certain policies to cover certain timeframes, simply be130
cause an agency has missed a statutory deadline. Instead,
where Congress has provided in the APA and the organic statute two sets of temporal guidance about a rule, it is more likely
that Congress still intends for the rule to apply to the specific
time period targeted in the organic statute. This is especially
true because, traditionally in administrative law, if there is a
conflict between the APA and the organic statute, the organic
131
statute governs. The problem with using the APA’s language
to justify a bar on retroactive rulemaking in the tardy-agency
context is particularly apparent in the case of National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n, where Congress enacted a complex,
132
multiyear regulatory scheme and where, even if EPA had met
the applicable deadlines, the agency would have needed to give

127. Id.
128. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4).
129. See PIERCE, supra note 19, at 484 (arguing that the “future effect” argument goes too far and misconstrues the language of the APA).
130. See id.
131. See Levy & Shapiro, supra note 32, at 486 n.59 (noting that the APA’s
provisions serve as gap-fillers and that the relevant organic statute trumps
the APA where the two conflict); see also 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2006) (declaring that
a subsequent statute will not supersede the APA unless “it does so expressly”).
132. Indeed, the intervenors in National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n
seize on the structure of the organic statute to argue that the EPA regulation
in question does not have primary retroactive effect. Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n I, 630 F.3d 145, 159–60 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (recounting the argument
of the intervenors that the level of detail in the statute essentially limits the
retroactive effect of the regulation to secondary retroactiveness). The D.C. Circuit did not rule on the intervenors’ argument and instead accepted that the
rule has retroactive effect and validated that retroactivity. Id. at 163–64.
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its rule some retroactive effect to cover the entire time period
133
targeted by Congress.
In the traditional retroactive rulemaking scenario, as in
Bowen, Congress has provided no guidance regarding the timing of the promulgation of a rule. The only guidance courts
have is the APA’s provision that defines rules as having “future
134
effect.” In the tardy-agency problem, Congress has instead
provided clear guidance that the rules in question should be
promulgated by certain dates and, therefore, should apply to a
certain timeframe. Relying on the language of the APA to bar
retroactive action in the tardy-agency context gives the APA’s
language greater power than it deserves and flouts congressional intent on critical policies. This key rationale for the Bowen rule does not justify a bar on retroactive rulemaking in the
tardy-agency context.
C. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN RULES AND ADJUDICATION AND
THE AVAILABILITY OF ADJUDICATION
Courts can also justify the bar on retroactive rulemaking
by pointing to the distinction between rulemaking and adjudication found in the APA. Justice Scalia, for example, argues
that rulemaking is by definition prospective under the APA and
that the retroactive/prospective distinction is one critical way to
135
distinguish between rulemaking and adjudication.
Justice
Scalia went further and pointed out that because an agency can
make retroactive policy through adjudication, it has other ave136
nues available to take needed retroactive action.
This distinction, used by courts and found within the APA,
is unhelpful in the context of the tardy-agency problem. Just as
an excessive reliance on the words “future effect” fails to address the tardy-agency problem, a myopic focus on rules being
prospective and adjudication being retroactive fails to take into
account Congress’s actions in the tardy-agency context. In the
tardy-agency context, Congress has made a determination that
a rule must be promulgated by a certain date, demonstrating

133. Id. at 163 (“The structure of the [organic statute] demonstrates that
Congress anticipated the possibility of some retroactive impacts . . . .”).
134. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2006).
135. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 218–22 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (examining the APA’s distinction between rules and
adjudicatory proceedings).
136. See id. at 224.
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its intent that the rule apply to a certain time period. Just
because an agency has missed a statutory deadline does not
change the fact that Congress wants a certain rule promulgated by a certain date. If an agency missed a statutory deadline
and then finished promulgating a rule retroactive to that deadline, it would not confuse the distinction between rulemaking
138
and adjudication.
Instead, it would merely mean that an
agency was acting to meet the demands of Congress in a specific statutory provision.
In National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n, for example,
EPA was not taking action that confuses the characteristics of
rules and adjudication. Instead, the agency was acting to meet
139
congressional requirements, even if later than required. Furthermore, in that case, if EPA had met the relevant deadlines,
its regulation would still have either had retroactive effect or
140
not applied to the entire time period targeted by Congress.
This built-in possibility of retroactivity demonstrates that, in
the organic statute in National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n,
Congress was less concerned with a distinction between types
of agency action based on their temporal applicability, and
more on exercising its will through policies that take effect at
certain times. The existence of an explicit statutory deadline
differentiates the tardy-agency problem from the traditional
retroactive rulemaking problem found in Bowen and shows that
reliance on the distinction between adjudication and rulemaking is insufficient to justify a bar on retroactivity.
Additionally, the availability of adjudication to make retroactive policy does not address the tardy-agency problem. In
National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n, for example, an agency would struggle to use individual adjudicatory proceedings to
apply its specific interpretation of the statute’s renewable fuels
requirements to individual refiners. Neither of these traditional
justifications for the bar on retroactive rulemaking sufficiently
addresses the tardy-agency problem.

137. See Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 22, at 937–49 (discussing the important meaning and intent underlying statutory deadlines).
138. Indeed, some administrative law scholars have responded to the ruleadjudication distinction argument by pointing to the fact that some laws and
regulations can be applied retroactively and it does not change the fact that
they are laws and regulations. See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 19, at 483–84.
139. See Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n I, 630 F.3d 145, 163 (D.C.
Cir. 2010).
140. See id.
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D. NOTICE CONCERNS
Courts also note that the lack of notice provided by retroac141
tive rulemaking is problematic. In a case like Bowen, the lack
of notice creates obvious hardship for the regulated parties. The
142
statute in Bowen contained no statutory deadline. Once the
original rule was struck down procedurally, the regulated parties had no notice that the Department of Health and Human
Services was going to reach back and grab $2 million in funds,
years beyond when the providers had received the relevant re143
imbursements. The facts of Bowen demonstrate that this lack
of notice could wreak havoc on the ability of a regulated party
to plan and predict costs, which Congress would presumably
like to avoid.
However, the regulated parties in National Petrochemicals
& Refiners Ass’n, as the court in the case noted, did have “ample notice” of the requirements that would be included in the
144
ultimate retroactive regulation. EPA had provided some prepromulgation warning of its regulatory goals and the possibility
145
that the regulation would have retroactive effect. Moreover,
the statute itself made clear that Congress was expanding its
renewable fuels program over a multiyear period and that EPA
would need to act to promulgate rules for this program by cer146
tain dates. In the tardy-agency context, unlike in Bowen, the
existence of a statutory deadline provides parties with a fair
warning that regulations are coming. Granted, this warning
147
may not include specific requirements or guidance. But the
statutory deadline would certainly provide more notice than
the agency did in Bowen. Thus, a notice argument fails to thoroughly justify a bar on retroactive rulemaking in the tardyagency context.
141. See Geoffrey C. Weien, Note, Retroactive Rulemaking, 30 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 749, 756–57 (2007) (discussing the tendency of courts to cite the
principle of fair notice as a reason for the bar on retroactive rulemaking).
142. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 205 (1988) (citing
42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A)).
143. See id. at 207 (“Respondents, a group of seven hospitals who had benefited from the invalidation of the 1981 schedule, were required to return over
$2 million in reimbursement payments.”).
144. Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n I, 630 F.3d at 163–64 (describing
the notice provided to regulated parties through the statute and notices of
proposed rulemaking).
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See supra note 4.
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E. THE GOOD-CAUSE EXCEPTION
Agencies have sometimes used the good-cause exception in
the APA as an alternative tool that helps mitigate the effects of
148
the bar on retroactive rulemaking. Section 553 of the APA
requires that agencies promulgate a substantive rule according
149
to notice-and-comment procedures.
There is an exception
from this requirement when an agency finds “good cause” and
150
publishes that finding in the rule. Although an agency cannot
promulgate a rule retroactively, it can use the good-cause exception to promulgate a rule much more quickly, avoiding the
151
onerous requirements of Section 553 of the APA. In the context of the tardy-agency problem, if an agency were to miss a
deadline, it could avoid added delay by promulgating the rule
as quickly as possible.
This strategy may be an effective tactic when an agency is
simply trying to move quickly and faces no deadline, but it does
not do enough in the tardy-agency problem scenario. Looking
again at National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n, the goodcause exception would not have helped EPA. In that case, EPA
had long since missed the late 2008 deadline to promulgate
152
regulations. After announcing its final set of regulations in
mid-2010 with the goal of applying them to the entire 2010 calendar year, using the good-cause exception would merely have
saved EPA some additional time. EPA would still have been
outside the timeframe envisioned by Congress and the delay
would have obstructed Congress’s desire to implement an ongoing, multiyear regulatory program. Furthermore, this assumes
that EPA could have argued it actually had good cause to
promulgate the rule without using the APA’s notice-andcomment procedures. It is doubtful that every agency facing a
tardy-agency problem would be able to prove actual good cause.
As National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n demonstrates, the
good-cause exception does not solve the tardy-agency problem.

148. See PIERCE, supra note 19, at 488 (explaining the tendency of agencies
to use the good-cause exception in Section 553 of the APA to make rules more
quickly, as an alternative to retroactive rulemaking).
149. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
150. Id.
151. See PIERCE, supra note 19, at 488.
152. Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n I, 630 F.3d 145, 147–52 (D.C.
Cir. 2010) (recounting EPA’s timeline of action under the relevant organic
statute).
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The preceding discussion demonstrates that the reasoning
behind the Bowen rule, and the alternative strategies agencies
use to work around the Bowen rule, will not sufficiently address
the tardy-agency problem. The failure of these explanations,
however, does not mean the bar on retroactivity should be lifted
entirely in the tardy-agency context. Indeed, even before Bowen, courts treated retroactivity carefully and closely examined
153
congressional intent. A brief discussion of the policy concerns
implicated by the tardy-agency problem shows that the solution
requires more than just an unnuanced blanket approach.
F. POLICY
The tardy-agency problem implicates significant policy
concerns. First, courts express the concern that allowing retroactive rulemaking will increase the tendency of agencies to
miss deadlines since agencies’ incentive to meet deadlines will
154
decrease. This is a relevant concern, because giving agencies
the express power to promulgate retroactive rules after missing
a deadline certainly could impact the urgency with which agencies approach statutory deadlines. However, the fact that retroactivity could be allowed in only limited circumstances (i.e.,
when the agency has not missed a deadline due to excessive delay or sloth) demonstrates that this policy concern does not
compellingly support a complete bar on such retroactive rulemaking because it is possible to address this concern without
adopting a blanket prohibition on retroactivity.
A different policy concern also warrants consideration.
Barring an agency from promulgating rules retroactively could
make it easier for an agency that disagrees with the policy
Congress has made in the organic statute in question to try to
155
obstruct the policy from being implemented. Imagine, for example, that Congress and the President enact a policy program
that requires years of implementation. However, in the midst of
implementation, a new President is elected. If this new President opposes the underlying program, his or her agents
throughout the executive branch may slow implementation in
153. See supra Part I.B.2.a.
154. Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n II, 643 F.3d 958, 958–62 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (Brown, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (noting
that the panel’s decision in National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n I “encourages lethargic administration”).
155. See Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 22, at 932–37 (analyzing the reasons Congress uses deadlines and the potential administrative conflicts that
can arise between a President and a Congress of different parties).
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order to lessen the impact of the legislation. The agencies
would know that whenever they miss a statutory deadline, the
required regulations would not apply retroactively to that statutory deadline. Having the reasonable power to promulgate
retroactive regulations, however, would ensure that an agency
would not be able to obstruct the will of Congress through its
own tardiness
The tardy-agency problem presents a clash of presumptions. Although interested parties would hope courts could resolve this tension, the reasoning courts frequently use in retroactive rulemaking cases, and the Bowen rule that reasoning
supports, fail to address the problem. The tardy-agency problem warrants a new approach to help courts and agencies navigate the murky waters of retroactivity and statutory deadlines.
But that approach should be nuanced, in order to reflect the
complex policy concerns implicated by the tardy-agency problem.
III. A NEW APPROACH: FOCUSING ON CONGRESSIONAL
INTENT
Any solution to the tardy-agency problem must respect existing precedent, respond to the various policy concerns presented by the issue, and find support in administrative law.
Furthermore, any new approach must succeed where the traditional retroactive rulemaking reasoning and doctrines have
failed, by addressing the unique issues presented by the tardyagency problem.
A. THE CONGRESSIONAL-INTENT APPROACH REFLECTS THE
UNIQUE NATURE OF THE TARDY-AGENCY PROBLEM
When faced with an agency that has missed a deadline for
promulgating a rule and has promulgated that rule retroactively, a court should not apply a blanket presumption barring ret156
roactive rulemaking. At the same time, the court should not
merely assume that because an agency has missed a deadline,
it automatically retains the power to make a reasonable rule
157
retroactive. Instead, out from under the umbrella of Bowen,

156. A blanket presumption is what Judge Brown proposes. Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n II, 643 F.3d at 958–62 (Brown, J., dissenting from
the denial of rehearing en banc).
157. The Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n I court comes close to allowing reasonable rules to be automatically retroactive, after focusing on the
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the court should conduct a searching inquiry to determine
whether Congress has implicitly granted retroactive rulemaking power in the statutory deadline provision in question.
Under this test, a court would examine whether Congress’s
deadline demonstrates a temporal directive to make a rule retroactive to the time period in question, trumping the Bowen
rule. The court would make this determination by closely analyzing the statutory scheme at issue. This analysis would require a court to analyze a statute clearly and conspicuously, different than the rather opaque and muddled approach taken in
National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n. Evidence of implicit
congressional intent could be that a statute is complex and interdependent and that its regulatory structure, in order to be
effective, requires regulations to be promulgated and applied to
158
certain timeframes. This approach could also take into account extreme hardship to the parties from retroactive rulemaking because Congress, in providing or failing to provide implicit approval for an agency to make retroactive rules, would
also presumably consider the impact of such a power on the
regulated parties.
This approach rejects a blanket presumption or rule. Instead, this approach is intensely focused on gauging congressional intent. If Congress has made a conscious policy choice to
regulate the timeframe in question, that intention would not be
upended because an agency missed a statutory deadline. The
congressional intent gleaned by applying the factors above
would, essentially, amount to the authorization for retroactivity
required in Bowen. However, if Congress did not demonstrate
such an intention, retroactivity would be barred, especially
when the hardship on the parties is great. This approach is
more systematic and reliable than the D.C. Circuit’s analysis in
National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n, which discussed the
peculiar scenario in that case and failed to ground its holding
159
in one line of reasoning. The congressional-intent test also
differs from the old Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Un160
ion balancing test, because it is concerned solely with Conunique peculiarities of the statute in question and applying a weak balancing
test. 630 F.3d at 162–63.
158. See, e.g., id. at 147–52 (describing Congress’s multiyear regulatory
framework, which increased requirements on fuel refiners in such a way that
failing to adhere to the statutory goals in one year could impact adherence to
the goals in successive years).
159. See supra Part I.B.2.c.
160. See supra Part I.B.1.
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gress’s implicit grant of power and not with the balancing of
multiple fuzzy factors. However, this test is consistent with the
underlying focus, in both the pre-Bowen balancing test and the
161
Bowen bright-line rule, with gleaning the will of Congress.
Most importantly, this test provides a solution to the increasingly urgent tardy-agency problem, while taking into account both of the serious policy concerns addressed in Part II.F.
Allowing retroactivity any time an agency misses a statutory
deadline would render statutory deadlines meaningless. Knowing that courts under this approach will be looking closely at
organic statutes to glean congressional intent, and that courts
will have the power to bar retroactivity if the hardship on the
parties is truly egregious, will encourage agencies to take statutory deadlines seriously and to consider carefully Congress’s
intent in enacting deadlines in the first place (i.e., does Congress truly mean for the regulation in question to be in place at
the deadline?). However, this approach also gives agencies the
power to act retroactively, reducing the likelihood that an
agency might use the bar on retroactive rulemaking to delay
and obstruct the implementation of a policy with which it disagrees. An agency still might purposely choose not to make retroactive rules, but, when faced with pressure from Congress
and stakeholders to take action on congressional priorities, the
congressional-intent test would make it much harder for agencies to hide behind the tactic of delay.
Practically, courts would implement this approach by
enunciating it in a decision, which would then provide guidance
to agencies. It is important to note that the congressionalintent approach would not conflict with Bowen. Instead, it
merely clarifies the Bowen holding, much as other post-Bowen
162
decisions have done in other ways, by acknowledging that an
explicit statutory deadline from Congress can, in some circumstances, amount to the required authorization from Congress to
163
engage in retroactive rulemaking. Once courts have established this new test, agencies would need to consider it in making any decision regarding the promulgation of retroactive
rules. While this decision may leave some ambiguity or uncertainty for agencies as they make decisions about rulemaking, it
is necessary given the wide variety of statutory and regulatory
161. See supra Parts I.B.2.a, I.B.2.b.
162. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (noting that the Bowen
case did not foreclose implicit authorization of retroactivity by Congress).
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schemes. As National Petrochemicals & Refiners Ass’n demonstrates, statutory schemes can include complex delegations to
164
agencies combined with specific requirements and mandates.
Complex statutes that require significant action on the part of
agencies by particular deadlines warrant close congressionalintent analysis to determine if retroactivity is warranted.
B. OTHER AREAS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SUPPORT THE
CONGRESSIONAL-INTENT APPROACH
The congressional-intent test, while a break from the tradi165
tional bar on retroactive rulemaking found in Bowen and
from the vague reasoning utilized by the D.C. Circuit in Na166
tional Petrochemicals & Refiners Ass’n, is consistent with the
approach taken in other areas of administrative law.
In other key cases, courts do hone in on congressional in167
tent when considering agency power. In fact, congressional
intent is a key factor in the complex doctrine that determines
the level of scrutiny to be applied to an agency’s interpretation
168
of a statute. Agencies regularly interpret the statutes they
169
administer. But judges have long debated to what extent
courts should adhere to agencies’ interpretations of statutes
170
that govern them. Various levels of scrutiny exist and courts
make the decision about how much deference to afford an agen171
cy’s interpretation by looking to congressional intent. Indeed,
courts, under the test in United States v. Mead Corp., look specifically to the statutory scheme in question and to the powers
delegated to the agency to determine whether Congress intend172
ed for the agency to have broad interpretative powers. For
example, Congress might enact a statute that creates an agency and, implicitly, give the agency the power to interpret its
originating statute. Conversely, Congress may create an agency
and give it minimal interpretative power. Either way, under
164. Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n I, 630 F.3d 145, 147–52 (D.C.
Cir. 2010) (explaining the renewable fuels program’s underlying statutory and
regulatory scheme, which was at issue in the case).
165. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208–09 (1988).
166. See Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n I, 630 F.3d at 162–64.
167. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227–31 (2001).
168. See Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax
Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1547–54 (2006).
169. See id. at 1548–49.
170. See id. at 1549.
171. See id. at 1548–54.
172. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227–31.
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Mead, courts look to congressional intent to determine court
173
scrutiny and agency power.
This approach is very consistent with the congressionalintent solution to the tardy-agency problem. Just as the Court
in Mead looks to the statutory scheme to glean the interpreta174
tive power Congress hopes to give an agency, a court under
the congressional-intent test would look to the scheme surrounding the statutory deadline to determine if Congress intended to give the agency retroactive rulemaking power. The
Mead analysis supports the congressional-intent solution to the
tardy-agency problem.
C. POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL-INTENT
APPROACH
One criticism of the congressional-intent approach could be
that it runs counter to Supreme Court precedent in Bowen and
is a roundabout attempt to allow retroactive rulemaking in limited circumstances. But this criticism misses a key element of
the Bowen decision: that the organic statute in Bowen included
no congressional deadline and left no indication of congression175
al intent regarding timing. The Court was left with the APA
176
and little else. The tardy-agency problem is different because
Congress has acted in the organic statute by providing an explicit statutory deadline. This deadline distinguished the facts
of the tardy-agency problem from the facts of Bowen and may
be seen, after a thorough analysis, to represent the required
authorization from Congress to act retroactively.
Critics could also contend that this approach is repetitive
or unnecessary. One could argue the approach is similar to
what the D.C. Circuit used in National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n and fails to offer much more than the standard balancing test applied in pre-Bowen cases like Retail, Wholesale &
177
Department Store Union.
This criticism misses the mark,
however, because the D.C. Circuit failed to articulate a clear
178
test in National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n and the preBowen balancing test included a number of complex and equal173. See id. at 218.
174. See id. at 227–28.
175. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 205 (1988) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A)).
176. See id. at 207.
177. See supra Part I.B.1.
178. See supra Part I.B.2.c.

2013]

RETROACTIVE RULEMAKING
179

1143

ly important factors. The congressional-intent test is not a
vague pseudotest and it does not require multifactor balancing.
Instead, it hones in on congressional intent, recognizing the
complex meaning that can underlie statutory deadlines. This
approach introduces a novel inquiry into the retroactive rulemaking jurisprudence, allowing the court the discretion to interpret congressional intent while rejecting both a bright-line
rule and an excessively unpredictable balancing analysis. Any
attempt to argue that the approach is unnecessary fails to take
into account the importance of the tardy-agency problem.
Agencies are enacting historic levels of regulations and are fac180
ing countless statutory deadlines. Regulated parties are facing the prospect of retroactive action. And the standard brightline rules fail to resolve the problem and implicate serious policy concerns.
Finally, critics might argue that the congressional-intent
test fails to address the notice and uniformity concerns that
regulated parties might have about any departure from the
bright-line Bowen rule. A regulated party might argue that this
approach only guarantees more unpredictable court rulings,
which leaves regulated parties subject to retroactive rulemaking on a judge’s whim. This critique fails to appreciate the simple nature of the congressional-intent test and the incentive effect it will have on agencies. Unlike the pre-Bowen multi-factor
181
balancing test, this approach focuses only on congressional
intent, through an analysis of the statutory scheme. This is a
predictable analysis which regulated parties will be able to follow and replicate as courts analyze statutes. More importantly,
because agencies will know courts are applying this test, they
will clearly lay out, in advance of any retroactive rulemaking,
their analysis of a congressional statute and whether it provides implicit retroactive rulemaking power. In other words,
the simplicity of this test, and its singular focus on congressional intent, will spur agencies to communicate clearly with
the parties they regulate and the courts they hope to persuade.
The agencies themselves will therefore offer some predictability
to the regulated entities. This test strikes the right balance between providing clarity to relevant industries, while also giving
agencies and courts the necessary discretion to enforce Congress’s will.
179. See supra Part I.B.1.
180. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
181. See supra Part I.B.1.
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CONCLUSION
Congress continues to enact complex and complicated statutes, replete with rulemaking deadlines. Yet, as agencies do the
work of creating rules and, from time to time, miss agency
deadlines, a question remains as to whether an agency can
promulgate a rule retroactive to the statutory deadline. This
seemingly esoteric issue recently sparked a heated debate in
the D.C. Circuit and may become a commonplace problem. The
traditional response, that an agency is barred from retroactive
rulemaking, fails to satisfactorily resolve the issue. But it is also not appropriate simply to grant an agency blanket power to
make retroactive rules upon missing an agency deadline. Both
bright-line rules fail to address the problem and carry significant policy implications.
Courts should adopt an alternative approach to solve the
tardy-agency problem. Judges should focus on whether a statutory deadline represents implicit congressional intent to give an
agency the power to make retroactive rules. To engage in this
inquiry, courts should consider the nature, duration, and complexity of the statutory scheme. This approach gives courts flexibility that a bright-line rule does not, but it also avoids the instability of giving the courts a multi-factor balancing test. And
it successfully addresses two competing policy concerns. This
approach will ensure agencies do not take statutory deadlines
any less seriously, while also guarding against agency efforts to
use the bar on retroactivity to obstruct Congress’s priorities.
The time for courts to adopt the congressional-intent approach
is now. Agencies are promulgating unprecedented numbers of
rules and are facing countless new deadlines. All the while, key
federal courts are failing to resolve the tardy-agency problem in
a consistent and coherent way. The congressional-intent test
provides such a way, consistent with key precedent and the
principles of administrative law.

